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Glossary and Definitions
From JSC 31000, Vol. I, Rev. D, Appendix B
ACCEPTANCE TEST: Formal testing conducted to determine whether
or not an item satisfies its acceptance criteria and to enable the user
to determine to accept or reject same. Required on an end item
where quantitative data is a prerequisite to demonstrate compliance
of the item with design/procurement specifications.
ACCEPTANCE TESTING: 1) Formal tests conducted to assure
equipment meets contracted or design requirements. Includes
performance demonstrations and environmental exposures to screen
out manufacturing defects, workmanship errors, incipient failures,
and other performance anomalies not readily detectable by normal
inspection techniques or ambient functional tests. 2) Tests to
determine that a part, component, subsystem, or system is capable of
meeting performance requirements prescribed in the purchase
specification or in other documents specifying adequate performance
capability for the item in question. Anomalies not readily detectable
by normal inspection techinques or through ambient functional tests.
ADVANCED DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM: A program which focuses
emerging generic technologies toward a space station application,
builds and integrates prototype components into subsystems for
demonstration in ground-based test bed facilities, and conducts flight
experiments using the Shuttle as necessary.
ALGORITHM: Mathematical steps used in the process of solving a
problem. The objectives of the algorithm is to produce a desired
result (output) from specified input.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: 1) A subfield of computer science
dealing with concepts and methods of symbolic inference by a
computer and the symbolic representation of knowledge used in
making inferences to make a machine behave in ways humans
recognize as "intelligent" behavior. 2) A discipline devoted to
developing and applying computational approaches to intelligent
behavior. Also referred to as machine intelligence or heuristic
programming.
ASSEMBLY: A number of parts, or subassemblies and/or any
combination thereof, joined together to perform a specific function
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and capable of disassembly. The distinction between an assembly
and a subassembly is determined by the individual application. An
assembly in one instance may be a subassembly in another, where if
forms a portion of an assembly.
COMMERCIAL PART OR ITEM: A part or item which is manufactured
primarily for the commercial rather than the government market
and having both commercial and government applications.
Commercial parts also include parts which are manufactured in
accordance with normal commercial quality controlled production
runs which meet or exceed the requirements of government
specifications or standards.
COMMON ELEMENTS: Equipment items or subsystems that are
interchangeable.
COMMON EQUIPMENT: Any equipment that can be utilized at more
than one operational site.
COMPONENT: 1) A major functional entity within a susbystem which
can contain both hardware and software subcomponents which can
be either collocated or physically distributed within the Space Station
Program element. 2) A particular hardware item within a system
(e.g., a pump, valve within pump, electrical power distribution box).
3) A combination of parts, devices and structures, usually self-
contained, which performs a distinctive function in the operation of
the overall equipment or system (e.g., transmitter, cryogenic pump,
encoder).
CONTRACTOR: The supplier of the end item and associated support
items to the Government under the terms of a specific contract.
CONTRACTOR-FURNISHED EQUIPMENT (CFE): CFE is equipment
provided to NASA by a prime contractor whose activities are
monitored directly by a NASA program or project office.
DELIVERABLE: An item of hardware, software, or documentation
which the contractor is required to deliver to the government.
DESTRUCTIVE PHYSICAL ANALYSIS: Analysis of EEE parts to assure
that the internal construction, quality, and condition of samples do
not vary from lot to lot.
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DEVELOPMENT TESTS: Tests performed with minimum rigor and
controls to substantiate a design approach. Includes tests performed
to minimize technical risks and to assist design engineering activities.
They encompass material selection, design tolerance verification, and
identification of operational characteristics.
ENVIRONMENTAL TEST: Any test performed under environmental
conditions other than ambient for the primary purpose of verifying
the quality of the GSE.
EXPERIMENT: The system of hardware, software, and procedures for
performance of a scientific or applications investigation undertaken
to: --Discover unknown phenomena
--Establish the basis of known laws
--Evaluate applications processes and/or equipment
FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA): Identification and
evaluation of what items are expected to fail and the resulting
consequences of failure.
FAULT TOLERANCE: 1) The ability to continue to operate in the
presence of anomalies or failures. 2) The number of failures which
can be allowed without disruption of nominal functional
performance.
GOVERNMENT-FURNISHED EQUIPMENT: Equipment in the possession
of or acquired by the Government, and delivered or made available
to a non-government organization.
LIFE CYCLE COSTS: A process and technique for predicting and
considering the entire cost of a program or project from inception to
ultimate disposition.
LIMITED LIFE: An equipment item or system is designated as having
a limited useful life in relation to its application. Limited life includes
operating time or cycles and age life.
LIMITED-SHELF-LIFE ITEM: Any item which deteriorates with the
passage of tim¢; and thus requires periodic replacement,
refurbishment, retesting, or operation to assure that its operating
characteristics have not degraded beyond acceptable limits. This
includes installed as well as stored components.
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LONG LEADTIME ITEMS: Those items which because of their
complexity of design, complicated manufacturing processes, or
limited production, may cause production or procurement cycles
which would preclude timely or adequate delivery, if not ordered, in
advance of normal .provisioning.
OFF-THE-SHELF DESIGN: An existing design for equipment with
known characteristics and proven history that has not been
manufactured for which product enhancement changes could be
incorporated into its production.
OFF-THE-SHELF EQUIPMENT: Equipment of an existing design that
has already been completely manufactured and is already for
delivery.
OFF-THE-SHELF HARDWARE: Production or existing design hardware
(black box, component) used in or for NASA, military, and/or
commercial programs.
OPERATING LIFE: The maximum operating time or cycles which an
item can accrue replacement or refurbishment without risk of
degradation of performance beyond acceptable limits.
PART: One or more pieces joined together which are not normally
subject to disassembly; it maybe deviated, EEE, or substituted.
Deviated Parts--Parts deviating to some degree from their
controlling specifications.
EEE Parts--Devices such as transistors, diodes, microcircuits,
resistors, capacitors, relays, connectors, switches, transformers
and inductors which are in compliance with the NASA Standard
Parts List MIL-STD-975.
Nonstandard EEE Parts-- A EEE part not listed in MIL-STD-975,
NASA Standard EEE Parts List or SSAEPL.
Grade 1.--The classification used for higher quality
standard parts intended for applications that the
responsible NASA project office has determined to be
critical.
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Grade 2--The classification used for inclusion within
the applicable standard and are intended for applica-
tions not requiring Grade 1 parts.
Substitute Part.s-- Parts differing from those specified in the
approved equipment design.
PROTOFLIGHT: A verification activity using flight hardware and
software for ground qualification in lieu of a dedicated test article.
The approach includes the use of reduced test levels and/or
durations and post-test hardware refurbishment where required.
PROTOFLIGHTING: The programmatic process of manufacturing a
singular item, using it for verification and limited (nondestructive)
testing, refurbishing it as required, and then using it as a flight
article.
PROTOTYPE: A hardware item having essential features of a
production unit, but differing in certain respects, such as packaging
and weight. It is used to support test activities, and to demonstrate
manufacturing techniques, but is not used for flight.
QUALIFICATION TESTS: Tests conducted as part of the certification
program to demonstrate that design and performance requirements
are realized under specified conditions.
REDUNDANCY: The existence of more than one means for performing
a given function.
RELIABILITY: The probability that a system or product will perform
in a satisfactory manner for a given period of time when used under
specified operating conditions.
REPAIR PARTS: Individual parts or assemblies required for the
maintenance or repair of equipment, systems, or spares. Such repair
parts may also be repairable or nonrepairable assemblies, or one-
piece items. Consumable supplies used in maintenance or repair such
as wiping rags, etc., are not considered repair parts.
RISK: 1) The probability of suffering harm or loss. 2) The chance
(qualitative) of loss of personnel, loss of system or damage to, or loss
of equipment or property.
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SOFTWARE VALIDATION: Tests and/or analyses to determine that
software design meets requirements:
A. Validation by Testing-- The process of conducting tests to
prove the software design meets established design require-
ments.
Be Validation by Analysis--I) Analysis performed to show a soft-
ware article previously validated is reused or recovered
(modified) to perform a similar function. 2) Analysis performed
to satisfy validation objectives when testing under simulated
mission conditions is not feasible or cost-effective or the need
exists to extrapolate test data beyond the performed points.
SPARE PARTS: Components, assemblies, and equipment that are
completely interchangeable with like items installed or in use which
are or can be used to replace like items removed during maintenance
and overhaul.
SPARE(S): An item or items whose fit, form and functions are
completely interchangeable with another or like item or items. Types
of spares for the SSFP are identified as: (1) development spare parts,
(2) initial spare parts, and (3) replenishment spare parts.
SPARING: The act of quantifying and identifying spares and
associated parts required to support an item or total system (e.g.,
control moment gyros--two spares).
SPECIFICATION: Document or combination of documents controlling
the design parameter (i.e., materials used, physical and electrical
characteristics.
SUBASSEMBLY: Two or more parts which form a portion of an
assembly or a component replaceable as a whole, but having a part
or parts which are individually replaceable (e.g., telephone dial,
mounting board with mounted parts, etc.).
SUBSYSTEM: A specific set of hardware and/or software functional
entities and their associated interconnections, which perform a single
category of functions (e.g., data storage and retrieval subsystem,
video subsystem). The functional level immediately below the
"system" level.
xiii
VERIFICATION: A process which determines that Space Station
hardware and software systems meet all design, performance, and
safety requirements. The verification process includes analysis, test,
inspection, demonstration, or a combination thereof.
The two levels Of verification activities include:
A.
B.
Hardware/Software Verification Activities--A process to
ensure specific hardware/software is built in accordance
with the design, meets established performance requirements
and is free of manufacturing and workmanship defects.
Design Verification Activides-=A process to ensure design of
the Space Station, subsystems, or components as designed and
meets requirements defined in contractual specifications. They
include both formal certification and system-level verification
activities (including hardware/software and interface compati-
bility). Where verification is not accomplished by testing,
analysis is to be performed.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TECHNICAL FACTORS: Examination of the past and present
prototype hardware development activities has disclosed that there
are a number of _valuable lessons to be learned from NASA's
experience as Well as from that era number of other industry and
government groups. In addition to the outlined approaches to the
construction and use of protytypes and the identification of the
driving factors, major findings are related to the impact of
component and system obsolescence, shortened time of support by
part manufacturers, the reduced number of part manufacturers, and
the resulting non-availability of replacement parts. These findings
all impact the planning for SBI Hardware prototypes.
It is shown that adaptation of modified commercial off-the-shelf
hardware has distinct advantages over new starts in the areas of
reduced cost and greater design maturity. Experience shows that the
adaptation must be done methodically and with great skill by
persons having extensive previous experience.
Many technical details for successfully implementing prototype
development programs are presented. They cover full hardware
development from a new start as well as development based on
modification of commercial off-the-shelf hardware.
The possible applications of each type of prototype article are
examined and the major program value of each identified. The limits
to apparent cost advantages and the increased risk of the
"protoflight" hardware approach are discussed as well as the
continued need for an engineering unit within the program.
P R O C ED U R E S : The various methods of developing prototype
hardware have been combined and simplified into an integrated
sequence of steps which define a recommended approach for each
set of circumstances. Using the flow chart procedure presented, one
determines a reference set of required hardware units. Then, by
considering the parameters identified in a family of "drivers", the
starting quantities are driven down or up to match them with the
particular programmatic application.
R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S : A number of items are identified and
discussed which, if uncorrected, will drive up costs and reduce the
number of potential prototype hardware suppliers supporting NASA.
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Ten major areas of concern are highlighted in the Recommendations
(Section 3.0) of this report.
C O N C L U S IO NS : The major conclusions of this trade study are
summarized in Section 4.0.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
The factors that should be used by designers and planners of space
hardware to determine the number and types of prototypes required
to successfully conduct a biomedical research program are
overwhelmingly numerous. Organized decision-making requires
subdivision of the problem such that it can be attacked in reasonable,
digestible pieces.
The prototyping activities to be considered in this study range from
no prototypes where a single unit serves as a flight unit, often called
a "protoflight", to multiple prototypes for each function; i.e., concept
unit, reliability unit, DVTU unit, training unit, back-up unit, etc.
Prototyping fits into a phase of system engineering which can
nominally be called "evaluation." (Machol, 1965)
The evaluation phase should determine whether the performance of
a system is adequate to fulfill the operational mission assigned to the
system. In a well-managed development program, the evaluation is
conducted throughout the design phase and is "largely completed
before the prototype is constructed." "It therefore follows that
evaluation should be largely completed before the really expensive
phases of prototype construction and test are undertaken." (Machol,
1965)
The following definitions apply to the various terms as used in this
study:
ENGINEERING PROTOTYPE: "A hardware item having essential
features of a production unit, but differing in certain respects such as
packaging and weight." Prototypes are "used to support test activities
and to demonstrate manufacturing techniques, but are not used for
flight."
PROTOFLIGHTING: "The programmatic process of manufacturing a
single item, using it for verification and limited (nondestructive)
testing, refurbishing as required, and then using it as a flight article."
(For purposes of this study, a protoflight unit is considered a flight
unit and not a prototype).
RELIABILITY: "Distribution of failures in the time domain"
QUALITY CONTROL: "Distribution of defects in a population"
OPERATION: "Activity resulting from the use of systems."
Some of the terms commonly used to refer to prototypes of
aerospace subsystems are as follows:
1. Breadboard
2. Proof of Concept Model
3. Brassboard
4. Pre-Production Model
5. Mock-Up (Not necessarily a "prototype")
6. Design Verification and Test Unit (DVTU)
7. Training Unit
8. Qualification Test Unit
9. Engineering Model
10. Thermal Test Article
These items are often semantically intertwined and mock-up units
are not necessarily operational prototypes--the need for mock-ups is
usually independent of the need for prototypes. Mock-ups are
usually non-functioning units used for a multitude of purposes.
Generalized drivers to define the number and types of mock-ups are
uniquely programmatic and are not a part of this study.
Analyses of the naming of prototypes have shown that the
fundamental categories might be listed in the order of increasing
fidelity as follows:
1. Breadboard ("Commercial Off The Shelf Unit")
2. Brassboard (Proof of Concept Model)
3. Design Verification and Test Unit (DVTU) (Engineering
Model)
4. Training Unit
5. Qualification Unit (Pre-production Unit)
Even these fundamental prototypes can have double and triple uses;
e.g., a DVTU might be used as a Qualification Unit and/or Back-Up
Flight Unit. Obviously, computer simulation might even be used for
some hardware to eliminate the need for the lower level prototypes.
(Hopcroft, 1988)
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Definitions and conventional uses for these units are as follows:
BREADBOARD: A breadboard is the first experimental combination of
hardware, and in some cases software, developed in a sequence of
progressively more complex prototype units. It may consist of a
group of standard test equipment, together with various
experimental circuits. It is used to demonstrate a concept and to
investigate or optimize various functions. Most digitial and some
analog circuit development is suitable for computer simulation rather
than hardware experimentation.
BRASSBOARD: A brassboard is a hand-crafted prototype unit which
usually incorporates all electronic elements of the final article. Its
configuration allows assessment of effects such as mutual circuit
interactions and distributed capacitance. Realistic computer
simulation of this evaluation unit is difficult to achieve. This
prototype is particularly useful in the evolution of radio-frequency
and high speed digital systems. It is often the first opportunity to
confirm anticipated interface compatibility.
DESIGN VERIFICATION TEST UNIT (DVTU) OR ENGINEERING MODEL
(EM): This prototype may be called either name. It is essentially
identical, both mechanically and electrically, to the flight article
except that it is assembled with commercial, rather than high-
reliability, parts. All design changes should be incorporated and
evaluated on this unit. Compatibility, software performance, and all
functional tests should be accomplished with this prototype. It
should also be subjected to extensive environmental tests. One of the
most valuable aspects of the DVTU or EM is that it normally allows
methodical _ analysis of the device and completion of all design
changes prior to the activation of rigorous formal SRM&QA
documentation procedures necessary for all subsequent activities.
QUALIFICATION UNIT: A qualification unit is the highest quality
prototype. It is absolutely identical to the flight hardware and
software in every respect. Ideally, it is reserved for formal testing
which verifies that the system or device meets all requirements and
specifications. Normally this system is not flown since it has been
exposed to higher than flight environmental test levels. The
exception is in a protoflight program where only one flight-
configured article is built, qualification tested, and flown. Every
aspect of the life of this unit is under strict procedural and
documentation control.
MOCKUP: Mockup units are not operational prototypes but they
demonstrate some particular attribute of the flight article and
thereby provide valuable support in design and application testing.
Typical evaluation activities include thermal and cooling tests, mass
distribution tests, .mechanical interface tests, and human factors
evaluations.
PROTOFLIGHT MODEL: (PFM) Under the protoflight concept, only
one unit is built using flight standard high-reliability parts. This
protoflight model combines the normal prototype and flight models
in some cost-critical applications. The protoflight model should be
preceded by a development/engineering model in order to allow
completion of all changes and engineering tests prior to fabrication of
the qualification/flight unit.
TRAINING UNIT: A training unit is a prototype article which is
normally dedicated to flight crew training. It should be physically
and functionally like the flight articles. In some cases, the
engineering model is used for this purpose. Nominal control
procedures apply to the unit unless it is designated a flight or spare
unit, in which case stringent SRM&QA procedures will apply.
The overriding reason for constructing engineering prototypes is to
provide "early warning of potential operational problems." (Machol,
1965). Other primary reasons are as follows:
1. Verify that operational performance meets design specific
specifications
2. Determine the effects of extreme environments
3. Assess reliability for extended periods of operation
4. Determine the effects of component tolerance and
variability on overall system performance
Some of the secondary uses of prototypes are as follows:
1. Train operators and maintenance personnel
2. Demonstrate system performance to users and manage-
ment
3. Debug system interfaces and software
4. Evaluate the EMI emissioa and susceptibility
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Figure I.I-i is a diagram which illustrates the role of prototypes in
the system disign process. The importance of a strong prototyping
program to the successful completion of an iterative design program
is obvious.
Figure 1.1-1
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1.2 PURPOSE
The objective of this study was to define the factors which space
flight hardware developers and planners should consider when
determining:
1. Number of hardware units required to support
program
2. Design level of the units
3. Most efficient means of utilization of the units
The analysis considered technology risk, maintainability, reliability,
and safety design requirements for achieving the delivery of highest
quality flight hardware. Relative cost impacts of the utilization of
prototyping were identified.
1.3 METHODOLOGY
Numerous sources of information on the utilization of prototypes for
the development of commercial hardware, space flight, research
hardware, and industrial hardware have been surveyed by literature
searches, personal interviews, and telephone interviews. The
following sources provided a significant input for this study: _
1. NASA past experience (Skylab, Spacelab, etc.)
2. Similar Shuttle requirements/experience
3. Experience of other programs (JPL Deep Space,
communications satellites, DOE, etc.)
4. Industrial experience (medical implants, downhote
instrumentation, etc.)
5. Space Station requirements already defined
6. Software development experience of similar
programs
Case studies of past and present NASA hardware development
experience have supplied considerable information describing the
proper use of prototypes in the research hardware development
process. The following NASA Life Sciences hardware programs
provided insight into the prototype development process:
Blood Pressure Measuring Unit
Blood Pressure Measuring System
Physiological Measuring System
(BPMU)
(BPMS)
(PMS)
(Skylab)
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Electromyograph Signal Conditioner
Electrocardiograph Signal Conditioner
Minicentrifuge
Body Mass Measuring Device
Gas Analyze r Mass. Spectrometer
Cassette Data Tape Recorder
Skylab Refrigerator/Freezer
Orbiter Refrigerator/Freezer
Baro Experiment Neck Cuff
LSLE Microcomputer
(EMG)
(ECG)
(BMM)
(GAMS)
(CDTR)
Large quantities of telecommunications equipment have been
developed by NASA/JSC and supplied as GFE to the manned space
flight programs. This equipment is similar in many respects to the
SBI hardware and the experience of these engineers and managers in
GFE hardware should be of direct applicability to SBI. The following
representative samples of this hardware were considered from the
prototype development standpoint:
e_medam Proto. Method
DFI Telemetry
Lunar Comm Ry
AF Tape Player
"IV Systems
Signal Process
Teleprinter
Text & Graph
Cabin Leak Det
Sir-C Payload
Apollo GFE
Apollo GFE
Apollo GFE
Apollo & STS GFE
STS GFE
STS GFE
STS GFE
STS GFE
STSG 
Shelf & Dev.
New Dev.
Mod. Off-Shelf
New Dev.
New Dev.
Mod. Off-Shelf
Dev/Shelf Tech.
Off-Shelf
Off-Shelf Mod/
Internat'l. Dev.
Representative personnel from the following fields were contacted
and supplied data and oninions for the study:
1. Manned space flight
2. Deep space flight
3. Geosynchronous communications satellites
4. Military satellites and undersea electronic devices
5. Military missile nuclear war heads
6. Medical electronic implants
7. Commercial communications satellites
8. Commercial undersea telephone electronics
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9. Commercial nuclear power instrumentation
I0. Oil industry deep hole instrumentation
The current NASA documents related to STS flight hardware and
Space Station Freedom hardware were reviewed. Various electronic
engineering databases were Searched using combinations of key
words; e.g., prototyping, modelling, simulation, systems, hardware,
etc. The "Computer Database Plus" yielded the following numbers of
citations for the listed key words:
Key Words No. of Citati¢n_
Prototyping or Modelling 6 6
Simulation and Hardware 28
Computer/Simulation/Prototype 4
Systems and Modelling 8
Systems and Simulation 295
Systems/Simulation/Hardware 1 6
These citations were all too general for direct utility to this study,
except as statistical background. Good, vigorous analysis work
pertaining to the effectiveness of prototyping in the engineering
design process is scarce.
Algorithms and decision flow charts were synthesized which reflect
the analysis of all of the data that were collected. These "road maps"
simplify and organize the decision making process, but the raw data
and opinions as summarized in the appendices of this report are the
supporting documentation with additional details which cannot be
adequately summarized in a few charts. The study utilized a
consensus approach to gather and compile pragmatic data rather
than approaches which are more inherently theoretical. The names
and dates in parentheses that are contained throughout this report
refer to the references of Appendices B and C.
It was found in the course of the study that a strictly numerical
rating system would cause the user to lose sight of the overall
system aspects. Thus, the use of more subjective inputs can retain
the "common sense" reality of the output. For example, the political
realities of the program cannot easily be quantified. Initially, it was
assumed that the quantity and quality-of prototypes required for
any piece of hardware might be determined by some formula
starting from "none." As the study progressed, it became obvious that
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the interrelationships were too complex to model in a meaningful,
yet simplistic, algorithm. Future studies of this type should consider
the use of artificial intelligence (AI) techniques.
Thus, the methodology was revised to specify the ideal quantity and
quality of prototypes required and then to identify the factors (or
"drivers") which would cause an increase or decrease in the actual,
required, prototyping activities. Attempts were made to separate
engineering requirements from programmatic requirements;
however, clear-cut distinctions could not always be made.
1.4 SCOPE
The development of Space Biology Initiative research hardware will
involve intertwined hardware/software activities. Although the
purpose of this study involved analyzing hardware, the software
development impact must be considered and included in the
analysis. Experience has shown that software development can be an
expensive portion of a system design program. While software
prototyping could imply the development of a significantly different
end item, an operational system prototype must be considered to be
a combination of software and hardware.
In the course of this study, hundreds of factors were identified that
could be considered in determining the quantity and types of
prototypes that should be constructed. In developing the decision
models, these factors were combined and reduced by approximately
ten-to-one in order to develop a manageable structure based on the
major determining factors.
The Baseline SBI hardware list of Appendix D was examined and
reviewed in detail; however, from the facts available it was
impossible to identify the exact types and quantities of prototypes
required for each of these items. Although the factors that must be
considered could be enumerated for each of these pieces of
equipment, the exact status and state of development of the
equipment is variable and uncertain at this time.
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2.0 FINDINGS
Examination of the SBI hardware development program and
extensive discussions with experienced hardware developers both
inside and outside NASA have disclosed a number of areas of concern
common to all-of the developers. The regularity with which the same
problems surface ina variety of diverse programs indicates that they
will recur during SBI hardware development. Solutions utilized by
those interviewed are, in many eases, suitable for inclusion in this
program from the beginning in order to preclude or minimize these
predictable difficulties. The following sections discuss the identified
problems relative to prototyping and their influence on hardware
development. They also suggest solutions which are tailored to the
SBI equipment development and procurement program. The findings
of this study are presented as an assessment by consensus.
Validation is also by consensus.
2.1 EQUIPMENT CATEGORIES
Previous programs have shown that SSF hardware systems will come
from one of three sources: 1) Existing or modified flight rated
hardware; 2) Adaptation of commercial off-the-shelf hardware; and
3) New design and development. Further, equipment will generally
fall into one of two categories: 1) Experiment-unique, for scientific
investigation; and 2) Operational, primarily for routine clinical tests,
emergency usage, and some experiment support.
2.1.1 EXPERIMENT-UNIQUE EQUIPMENT
Equipment for experimental applications is intended to explore a
particular phenomenon or group of objectives. Groups of standard
operational equipment can be used, but customized special purpose
equipment is more desirable in order to simplify configurations,
increase probability of success, more efficiently use the crewperson's
time, and increase precision.
With few exceptions, equipment in this class will be designed and
developed specifically for its narrow field of investigaton. It is highly
unlikely that any single piece of commercially available equipment
can be adapted to perform the function, though several pieces of
commercial hardware might be combined with new elements into a
single, unique test system. Development of such a system, together
with the other aspects of a research program, would normally be
under the supervision of a scientist (Principal Investigator).
2.1.2 OPERATIONAL EQUIPMENT
This equipment is used, singly or in groups, for numerous
applications which include vehicle/crew operations, health
maintenance, emergencies, performance monitoring, or experiment
support. It may be derived from modified flight or commercial off-
the-shelf hardware or it may be custom designed. It will not
normally be under the cognizance of a principal investigator but
rather managed as a single item or group of instruments.
2.2 ADAPTATION
HARDWARE
OF COMMERCIAL OFF.THE-SHELF
In some cases commercial equipment exists which offers capability
near that required for the space hardware. If a number of
considerations related to the product and manufacturer are
favorable, its adaptation can be a cost-effective and efficient method
of obtaining the desired capability.
If executed or managed poorly, however, this approach can result in
a very expensive, unreliable array of patches on top of patches. The
preferred approach is to repackage as little as possible and to make
fundamental mechanical or circuit redesigns only when absolutely
necessary. If drastic changes are required, then the wrong unit has
been selected for modification or a complete new design from
"scratch" should be reconsidered. Since continuation of a modification
program beyond a critical point leads so certainly to trouble, some
mechanism should be built into the technical monitoring process
which will trigger an automatic change to a new-design program. The
inertia to continue such a program is tremendous. The management
procedures should make it necessary to justify continuation rather
than to justify a new start. The following cases, based on good and
bad experiences, should be studied for their lessons in planning and
implementing such a program.
Examples of very successful modifications are the Mini Oscilloscope
(JOO1), which required a different power supply, and the Automatic
Blood Pressure System (ABPS), which required repackaging. Both of
these devices followed the rules of using highly qualified,
modification-experienced, personnel and incorporating a minimum of
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fundamental system changes. Unsuccessful adaptation efforts are
numerous. The adverse experience in NASA and industry has been so
costly in dollars or reputation that some of those involved have
either moved on to other activities or refuse to discuss the proble.ms
unless the project names are not mentioned. (Buckley,1989;
Evans,1989; Richards,1989)
2.2.1 MCOTS POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO RELIABILITY
Proper use of commercial, off-the-shelf hardware can contribute
significantly to the operationa ! reliability of that SBI hardware which
properly fits into a MCOTS program. Hardware that has been
manufactured and distributed in quantity over several years has
accumulated huge numbers of operational hours of experience. This
database allows the manufacturer to reduce marginal designs and to
factor component tolerances and selection into the product. This type
of experience is usually lacking in hardware uniquely designed for
space flight. The operational reliability demonstrated in the
automotive and appliance industries, for example, has never really
been achieved in equipment designed for limited distribution. This
difference in experience occurs in spite of the fact that high-
reliability components and rigorous design procedures are followed
in some of those limited-distribution industries. Perhaps, each of the
units that were manufactured and distributed commercially might be
considered a prototype. Thus, the customers/consumers became the
testers of numerous prototypes. This huge experience base of
information is difficult to capture or duplicate by building a total of
only four or five units.
This seemingly enigmatic experience can also be elicited from the
various companies that attempted to make commercial products
from medical hardware developed for the space program in the
decade of the 1970s. In general, these companies found that
commercial versions of the high-reliability equipment designed for
space flight demonstrated disappointing operational reliability when
manufactured and. distributed in quantity. The existing "lower state-
of-the-art" medical monitoring equipment that had been on the
market for several years was significantly more reliable on an
operational basis than the new-technology, high-reliability designs
which had been proven extensively in theory and had even
undergone full qualification testing. It was only when this hardware
was produced in quantities over several years that it established an
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operational reliability that was even of the same order of magnitude
as the older commercial-off-the-shelf hardware.
Thus, one has to consider the subjective, informal prototype
experience behind_ commercial-off-the-shelf equipment. A company
that responds tO its user's complaints and has mechanisms in place to
change design, manufacturing ttechniques, procedures, and
components based upon the ooperational experience of its customers
can produce a superior product that is thoroughly "debugged." In
evaluating commercial-off-the-shelf hardware, the huge numbers of
"hidden prototypes" must not be forgotten or neglected. (Schulze,
1989)
2.2.2 MCOTS TECHNICAL SKILL REQUIREMENTS
The process of modifying commercial off-the-shelf equipment for use
in a manned space program should be undertaken only by skilled
engineers and technicians who have successfully performed this
analysis and modification numerous times. There is a pronounced
learning curve which is very demanding of newcomers to this
activity. Well-developed engineering skills are required to determine
the suitability of the existing system design, circuit implementation,
component selection, interface compatibility, software design, etc.
Related engineering experience is required to grasp fully the
subtleties of a complex design, especially where the documentation is
limited. Use of custom integrated circuits and sophisticated
embedded computer functions add greatly to the skills required to
identify the implications of modifying and applying a device in some
way other than that intended by the original designer.
The use of COTS equipment generally requires careful assessment
and evaluation of the following:
Performance versus requirements
Safety
Capability to function in zero-g
Materials compatibility (flammability, outgassing,
shelf-life, etc.)
Environmental qualification (vibration, sho,:k,
temperature, pressure, etc.)
Weight and volume
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In addition, special insight into the logic and procedures involved in
FDA approval of medical equipment is needed to avoid invalidation
of the extensive experience base inherent in commercially available
medical products.
Practical experience and detailed knowledge of technical
programmatic reqt_irements is essential to assess the more
mechanical attributes and limitations of a candidate for modification.
The scope of experience required ranges across diverse technologies
which include human factors, power sources, cooling, non-metallic
materials, mechanical robustness, and potential impacts of extremes
of thermal, shock, and vibration exposures.
Scientific and medical flight hardware will be used directly by the
astronauts and should receive thorough human factors consideration.
Hazards to the crew and demands on their time must be minimized.
It is desirable for human factors experts to participate throughout
the project. Personnel with extensive experience in training a variety
of crew persons can be of immense benefit to the program.
Continuous consideration of typical crew demands can prevent
additional changes later in the program.
The variety and subtly of required skills approach those of an "art",
implemented with extreme attention to detail. Miscalculation or
under estimation can lead to a domino reaction of one change causing
another--and then another. (Evans, 1989; Richards, 1989
2.2.3 MODIFICATION CANDIDATE SELECTION
Selection of a suitable candidate for a modification program requires
much more than picking a good piece of hardware. Consideration
must also be given to a series of other factors. These typically include
the match between a product's performance and the required
specifications, the factory's ability and interest in providing support,
the extent of required modifications, the potential for
repair/maintainability, and the total cost for modification,
application, and lifetime support.
A selection process used successfully in the recent past by NASA for
obtaining COTS medical and science related hardware incorporates
the following steps:
15
1. Determine the useful performance features offered by each
reasonable candidate unit available in the market.
2. Combine the most useful of these features into a
composite-standard list of desired features.
3. Compare .the capability of each candidate unit the optimum
capability represented by the composite-standard list.
It is often useful to make a matrix which facilitates ranking the units
numerically on each of the characteristics listed. This ranking,
together with the evaluator's seasoned judgment, should provide a
clear "best choice".
The single unit providing performance closest to the composite-
standard becomes the prime candidate for selection. At this point, it
is usually desirable to purchase the prime candidate and two or
three close runners-up for further, detailed, examination.
Evaluation of each candidate should consider many factors, such as:
• Workmanship
• Robustness
• Internal element accessibility for repair/modification
• Human factors: location and feel of controls, displays, etc.
• Breakable glass or sharp edges
• Fundamental system engineering approach used
• Suitability of the circuit implementation
• Limits to fault propagation
• Test connectors or self diagnostic routines
• Quality, quantity, depth, and completeness of documentation
for installation, operation and maintenance
• Software provided and availability of source codes and support
• Cooling technique and coldplate adaptability, if needed
• Power sources used and circuit overload protection
• Electrical, fluid, and gas interfaces
• Connector configuration
• Quantity and use or non-metallic materials
• Potential ignition sources, catalytic materials, etc.
• Hazardous materials - mercury, ethylene dioxide, etc.
• Nonstandard, unreliable, hazardous, or obsolete parts
• EMI emission or susceptibility
• Measured performance against advertised specifications
• Mechanical configuration: size, weight, shape, mounting, etc.
• Dependence on I G for proper operation
• Electromechanical and data/computer interfaces
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In addition to the detailed evaluation outlined above, discussions
with the manufacturer and a visit to his factory should reveal his
willingness and ability to support the product throughout the phases
of modification and application. Chances of success increase with his
degree of Professionalism which is often reflected in the quality of
his documentation. A lack of genuine interest and ability on his part
should automatically disqualify the unit from further consideration.
(Evans, 1989)
It is necessary to determine whether the essential documentation
describing electrical, mechanical and software code designs is
proprietary. The status of patent activity may make essential
information unavailable or create disclosure limitations with which
NASA cannot comply.
The proposed steps in a procedure for selecting and purchasing COTS
hardware for modification are shown in the diagram of Figure 2.2-1.
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Figure 2.2-1
Procedure for Selecting and Purchasing
Commercial Off-The-Shelf Hardware for Modification
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l
I
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1
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2.2.4 QUANTITY OF UNITS TO PURCHASE
The number of units required will normally include those for
redesign, engineering test, interface compatibility test support,
qualification testing, training, flight, and spares. Additional units
should be purchased, and stored at this time, for cannibalization to
provide unique parts and parts which will become obsolete and
unavailable during the program life.
It is imperative that all units to be modified in a MCOTS program be
identical before modification, both physically and electrically. Several
actions may be taken in order to ensure that all units are the same.
The units purchased should be from the middle of a single, stable,
production run. They should have sequential serial numbers, unless
one has been rejected for technical reasons. The total number of
units ever to be purchased should be obtained at this time.
All documentation describing theory of circuit and mechanism
operation, operation and repair procedures, software codes, and
operational programming procedures should be obtained at the time
of the purchase and should accurately describe any revisions or
modifications incorporated in the product received. (Evans, 1989)
2.2.5 WHO SHOULD DO THE MODIFICATIONS?
It is very important for the modification team to possess expert
ability in many areas. In-depth knowledge of the system, circuit, and
software operation is essential. The original designer has an obvious
advantage over any others in making design changes in these areas.
It is, therefore, desirable for the designer to work with the NASA
modification team if he or she is still employed by the manufacturer
and if the manufacturer is cooperative.
Experience has shown, however, that manufacturers usually are not
sufficiently familiar with many of the other requirements to be met
for manned space flight. The experienced NASA modification team is
in the best position to handle the engineering of other modifications
beyond circuit and software changes.
Normally, a manufacturing facility is configured for production
rather than for custom modification of hardware. While each
situation must be judged separately, it might often be better to make
the actual physical modifications in a NASA prototype shop or in a
19
private facility specializing in custom modification and fabrication.
Organizations which develop specialized equipment for the military
often have the necessary facilities, organization, and space-oriented
knowledge.
The Shuttle teleprinter development is an example of a combined
effort by a manufacturer and NASA. The apparatus was derived from
a production millitary device. Honeywell pulled partially completed
units from the production line, and made mechanical modifications in
their model shops. NASA/JSC personnel designed and fabricated
specialized interface electronics. NASA model shops fabricated a
mechanical interface to a standard spacecraft locker. Qualification
testing was performed in JSC facilities.
The teleprinter project demonstrates the cost and time-saving
potential of modified off-the-shelf hardware. This six-month
program (time from authorization to flight) provided the selection,
design, modification, testing, qualification, and delivery to KSC. The
equipment involved were electronic breadboards, a DVTU, a
qualification model, four flight articles, GSE, a ground terminal and
interface boxes. The cost was perhaps 25% of a new development
from "scratch." The program success can be attributed to the
excellent military product history and a highly motivated team with
a full-time, dedicated manager who was personally challenged.
(Evans, 1989; Richards, 1989)
2.3 NEW DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT
2.3.1 GENERAL FINDINGS
The alternative to adaptation of existing hardware is the design and
development of a completely new device or system. This approach,
typical for experiment-unique equipment, allows the configuration
and performance to be matched exactly to the task. It affords the
opportunity to automate test set-up or configuration, calibration,
operating procedures, data acquisition, calculations, and
interpretation of results. Comparisons must be made to determine
the extent of automation appropriate in each case.
In new designs, use may be made of common, interchangeable,
functional modules. If these elements are to be compatible with
other hardware systems, then it is imperative that a systems
engineering approach be applied to all hardware involved. Special
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care must be exercised in engineering, procurement, and technical
management unless the common elements have been fully flight
qualified before they axe mandated for multiple usage.
Many tens of millions of dollars worth of GFE flight hardware has
successfully been developed for manned space flight programs from
Apollo through Shuffle using the following procedure as described by
Sinderson (JSC,TCDD). The procedure is similar to that used for Life
Sciences and other experimental and operational hardware.
A Representative Procurement, Qualification, and
Maintenance Procedure
1. A document was generated which set down a preliminary set
of requirements and interfaces.
2. A review was held including representatives of flight crew
operations (users); project/program offices (funders); subsystem
manager; supporting and interfacing groups such as hardware
integration, payloads, and network communication (GSFC); reliability,
safety, quality assurance, and integration/compatibility testing
laboratories; and the engineering group designing and providing the
hardware. Out of this review emerged a set of requirements which
provided the best combination of capability, simplicity, cost
effectiveness, SRM&QA, and potential for accommodating future
needs. The resulting information was formalized in a document
which became the basis for the subsequent engineering
development, the specifications and the interface control document.
3. A buy-or-develop decision was made based on a thorough
review of available hardware/techniques and in-house evaluations
of candidate off-the-shelf devices.
4. If a suitable device was in production, the specification was
adjusted and a MCOTS (modified commercial off-the-shelf)
procurement program was initiated. Some modifications were
accomplished within ISC while the manufacturer was willing and
equipped to modify other products to accommodate special
requirements such as selection or elimination of nonmetallic
materials, reduction of weight, addition or elimination of some
features, and incorporation of special testing.
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5. If development was required, a program of in-house work was
begun which included breadboarding critical elements, competitive
evaluation of algorithms, system simulation, and extensive testing of
candidate techniques in a fully integrated spacecraft and groun.d
configuration. The in-house investigation and findings were
completely documented and very detailed specifications and test
criteria were prepared.
6. A competitive, often firm-fixed-price, procurement was
initiated. Vendors were invited to propose implementations using the
best and most cost-effective circuit and hardware techniques utilized
in their facilities. The well-documented in-house NASA work
eliminated vendors' concerns about potential expensive
complications and produced a sufficiently high level of confidence to
warrant minimum dollar, fixed-price proposals even where extensive
development was involved.
7. The insight gained (and the definitive interface control
documentation developed) during the in-house work provided an
outstanding degree of integration compatibility of the delivered
product.
8. Complete environmental test equipment was available in the
JSC engineering laboratories, allowing qualification testing to be done
either there or in the vendor's facility.
9. Complex maintenance and repair work was usually done at the
vendor's facility. Spare parts and kits of parts for additional builds
were maintained both in bonded storage at JSC and at the vendor's
facility, since a limited number of units were produced and there
was the possibility that critical components would become
unavailable.
10. Hardware refurbishment and preparation for flight were
accomplished at JSC while vehicle installation was done at KSC.
A highly successful variation of the above procedure involved a two-
step approach. In the f'n'st phase, a contractor or in-house engineers
researched the design prospects and built a proof of concept model
which demonstrated the concept and its growth potential to
management for programmatic approval. The second phase
incorporated a separate hardware development program as
described in steps 1-10 above. A highly successful example of such a
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two-phase program was the LCRU (Lunar Communication Relay Unit)
which sent live television directly from the Moon to Earth under the
real time command of an operator in the JSC Mission Control Center.
The following sections provide additional information related to the
procedural steps above. The information is derived from a consensus
of the individuals providing the experience data base.
2.3.2 REQUIREMENT DEVELOPMENT
There apparently exists some disagreement over the semantics of a
requirement versus a specification. A reasonable understanding can
be obtained by considering a "spectrum" of specificity. One end can
be defined as a requirement and the other end as a specification.
Although they deal with the same essential elements, they vary in
degree of specificity. For the purposes of flight hardware
development, it is appropriate to define a requirement as a broad
statement of the need, one which describes the capability or the
functions to be provided and the circumstances under which they
will operate.
Conversely, a specification describes precisely the capability, the
method of providing it, the exact details of the environment and
resources, as well as the test methods and acceptable limits by which
the performance will be confirmed.
A special challenge exists in the clarification of requirements in
science and medical-related hardware development. There is a
perception that many scientists and engineers view requirements,
specifications, and developments so differently that there exists a
fundamental communications problem. Deliberate action must be
taken to bring the scientists (who have the need) and the engineers
(who will fulfill it) together in a cooperative relationship which will
foster creativity, productivity, and quality. Though the personnel
may report to different organizations, it should be possible to create
a spirit which bonds them as a team, stimulating communication
while defining responsibilities and expectations. The result can be a
synergism of creativity and energy which allows sharing successes as
well as failures. The team, probably best moderated by a senior
engineering manager, should scrub the requirements until clear
statements exist which properly describe the need without "gold
plating." (Evans, 1989; Sinderson, 1989)
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2.3.3 TECHNIQUE AND APPROACH RESEARCH
With a clear statement of the requirements in hand, the team can
methodically explore for the best theoretical and practical methods
for solution of the basic problem. This may well include laboratory
evaluation of variotis techniques, algorithms, etc.
A survey of the market place can reveal which of the theoretical
methods are being used commercially. Examination of the equipment
in use in the field will reveal the ease of application, reliability,
accuracy as well as subtle problems in the man/machine interface.
A 'Phase A" study by specialized experts in the field has been
productive in many instances. The refinement of in-house expertise
which occurs in this process is invaluable in implementing the actual
hardware development.
A well-defined approach, which utilizes the in-house information,
perhaps augmented by experience with laboratory hardware, can be
formulated. Good documentation from this work serves to inform
management of technical details, to help secure funding, and to
dispel apprehensions of potential bidders concerning the difficulties
and unknowns in building the article. Experience has shown that the
technique can sufficiently satisfy bidders to result in firm-fixed-
price contracts, an excellent control of costs.
2.3.4 SPECIFICATION DEVELOPMENT
The ground work described above results in the insight and detailed
information needed to generate a thorough, detailed, specification.
Few things have more value in cost effectively obtaining excellent
prototype hardware than a good specification. A major cost-cutting
aspect of a well-developed specification is its ability to avoid
technical changes and disputes over test methods and tolerances.
2.3.5 TECHNICAL MONITORING
The technical monitor should be a prime member of the NASA
engineering team. He is the only person other than the procurement
officer who can give direction to the contractor. All of his direction
must be of a technical nature and must be within the scope of the
contract. Changes of scope alter the contract's dollar value and must
be negotiated by the contracting officer only.
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The development of some medical experiment hardware for Skylab
used a manufacturer's expertise to substitute for the Phase A and
team activity described above. In these cases, the PI acted as the
technical monitor. Breadboards were moved from the contractor's to
JSC's laboratories where testing with human subject was done. A high
degree of cooperation was achieved and high-quality equipment
resulted. The need for JSC in-house work is greater now because
there are very few appropriate manufacturers remaining with both
medical and space flight hardware experience. NASA must take the
technical lead in cultivating an industry support base.
2.3.6 ANALYSIS AND REVIEW
In addition to the pre-procurement analyses discussed above, many
other areas of design analyses exist which may potentially add to the
assurance that the prototype and flight system will be safe and
reliable. The following list identifies many elemental analyses from
the conceptual, preliminary, and final design phases. The size,
criticality, sophistication, and specific end product of a development
program determine which items are appropriate.
I Conceptual design phase
a. Preliminary hazards analysis
b. Preliminary failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA)
c. Reliability allocations
d. Conceptual design review
2. Preliminary design phase
a. Preliminary hazards analysis (update)
b. Preliminary FMEA (update)
c. Reliability allocation (update)
d. Common cause failure analysis
e. Redundancy techniques/standby
f. Preliminary fault tree analysis (FTA)
g. Stress/strength analysis
h. Configuration optimization technique
i. System design review (PDR)
3. Final design phase
a. Hazards analysis
b. FMEA
c. Reliability predictions
d. Breadboard, brassboard, mockup, & engineering
modes tests
e. Criticaldesign review (CDR)
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.f. Qualification tests
g. Equipment design reviews
• Changes
• Data requirements
Post-Production phase
a. Verit_ication
b. Certification
c. Flight Readiness Review (FRR)
Obviously, guidance by an experienced technical monitor is essential
to keep most manufacturers out of bureaucratic trouble. The need for
some programmatic requirement simplification to achieve affordable
reliability is addressed later in this report.
2.3.7 TEST AND EVALUATION OF ENGINEERING MODEL
This unit, similar to the flight unit except for its construction with
commercial parts, is perhaps the most important of all prototypes. It
receives all changes and every type of test, usually to levels
exceeding flight and qualification. As a result, there should be no
need to make any changes whatever to the qualification or flight
units. There is more known about this unit than any other--ever. By
subjecting it to higher than the qualification level in every test, it is
possible to define the margins of physical and electrical performance
for the flight articles. The engineering documentation developed on
this unit should be complete. Under normal circumstances, the
extremely rigorous SRM&QA documentation begins after this unit.
With all problems solved using the engineering model, it should be
possible for the qualification and flight units to move on through
assembly and test without any negative documentation.
2.3.8 FABRICATION OF TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION
UNITS
The training unit is normally the last of the units to be built under
prototype conditions and controls. It should be configured and
operated very much like the flight articles. The primary difference is
that it is normally built with commercial quality parts. In some
instances, there is a desire for it to serve as a flight spare. If that is
the plan, it must be built identically to flight units and under the
same controls and documentation. This arrangement can be
undesirable since its primary training use would be very restricted
and encumbered by operating limitations, required presence of
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inspectors, and documentation. The original objective, to reduce costs,
could easily be lost in the "red tape."
The qualification unit is usually the first item off the flight article
assembly line. This is desirable since it truly represents the flight
article. However, ff it does not pass qualification tests, the flight
articles built along -with it must receive the same modifications that
it receives.
2.3.9 FLIGHT HARDWARE PRODUCTION
"Production", when used to describe flight hardware is perhaps a
misnomer since there are so few units built. It does imply the correct
impression that such units are the highest quality and best
documented units available. Full SRM&QA (suitable for the criticality
class) imposed.
2.3.10 SPARES, REPAIR AND MAINTENANCE PROGRAM
Information gained in the prototype analysis and testing program
adds to the original criticality definition to confirm the planning basis
for this activity. The specifics of the spare parts inventory are driven
by the design and flight application. Detailed drawings, schematics,
software source/debug codes, adjustment/allingment procedures and
perhaps an "expert system" for trouble-shooting and repair are all
forms of documentation which must be obtained at the time of
design and fabrication. Shuttle experience has shown that economy
here is very short-sighted. If it is possible at all, later reconstruction
of this information is extemely expensive. (Sinderson, 1989;
Richards, 1989)
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2.4 DETERMINATION OF PROTOTYPE/FLIGHT QUANTITIES
2.4.1 CONCEPT OF DETERMINATION METHOD
The many factors which influence the required number of prototypes
have been Combined and arranged into a logic flow with three
fundamental steps. The logic moves from an input of hardware
requirement definition, through 1) risk classification, 2)
implementation plan outline, and 3) quantity adjustment, to emerge
as the quantity definition output, as shown below.
(INPUT)
HARDWARE REQ_ DEFINITION
I
RISK CLASSIFICATION
I
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN OUTLINE
I
QUANTITY ADJUSTMENT BY DRIVERS
i
QUa -TrrY D ON
(otrrl, trr)
2.4.2 DEFINITION OF REQUIRED TERMS
A clear understanding of the quantity definition method requires
that several terms be understood. They are:
PAYLOAD CLASSES:
• Class A payloads are those for which a minimum risk
approach is clearly dictated by prohibitively high
cost of consequence of failure, or by unacceptable
combination of costs and intangible factors
associated with failure. A full formal qualification
and acceptance program is mandatory.
Class B payloads are those for which an approach character-
ized by reasonable compromise between minimum
risks and minimum costs is appropriate due to the
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capability to recover from in-flight failure by some
means that is marginally acceptable. The qualification
and acceptance program is less stringent than Class A.
• Class C payloads are those for which re-flight is a possibility.
This class was originally established for certain STS
paylo/tds where manifesting can accommodate a re-
flight in the event of an in-flight payload associated
failure. Duration of payload operations for Space
Station can be orders of magnitude greater than on
STS, and the policies concerning routine re-flight
on Space Station have not yet been established.
On-orbit servicing may enable recovery from
failure without the requirement for a separate
flight opportunity. The qualification and accept-
ance program is less formalized than in Class B.
• Class D payloads are those that have objectives worth achiev-
ing at a cost not to exceed the amount required for a
single, low-cost attempt. The qualification and accept-
ance program is limited to verifying safety and inter-
face compatibility.
(From OSSA Classification Instruction, 1988)
PROTOTYPE UTILIZATION:
• Conventional Development: A development program using a
sequence of progressively more complex prototype
units for each step from concept through engineering
development and on to qualification testing.
Protoflight Development: A procedure in which only one
flight model (PFM) is built to flight standards with
high-reliability parts. Some use this unit for develop-
ment, qualification testing, and flight, ESA and others
include an engineering moder (EM).
EQUIPMENT SOURCES:
• Modified Commercial Off-The-Shelf (MCOTS): Equipment in
commercial production which, with modification, can
be adapted for flight.
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New Development: A development program starting
from a "clean page", using either a conventional
development or protoflight program, as appropriate.
2.4.3 OUTLINE OF PLANS
One of two development and prototype utilization plans is used. The
plan selected depends on the class of the equipment (A and B or C
and D). Each plan is designed around a different "reference" quantity
of prototype equipment and a different degree of SR&QA rigor. Each
plan is outlined below:
PLAN #1, a minimum cost approach for classes A & B:
The number of units shown is the reference quantity and will
be modified by the drivers. It is based on consensus.
Analysis, reviews, SR&QA, and testing are rigorous.
Engineering development is based on MCOTS or a new start.
Use this reference quantity to support these functions:
Number of Units
1 - Brassboard
Function Supported
• Hardware and software design
Engineering unit *Design adjustments and tests
,System interface compatibility
tests
,Software performance tests
*Testing - through qualification
level
,All changes and fixes
*Mechanical interface tests
,EMI tests
*Human factors integration
,Confirmation of flight harness
1 - Qualification unit ,Qualification tests
,Training
1 - Flight unit • Flight (application may require
more)
1 - Spare *Flight
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Repair and Maintenance Program (Quantity depends upon
whether equipment is built from new-start or is MCOTS)
If MCOTS ........... Add 3 more units during purchase
for cannibalization and/or for
additional build.
If New S_rt ......... Buy parts for 2 complete kits plus
buy selected critical parts. (a kit is
all the parts, except chassis, required
to build on unit)
PLAN #2, a minimum cost approach for classes C & D
The number of units shown is the reference quantity and will
by modified by the drivers. It is based on consensus.
Analysis, reviews, SR&QA, and testing are less rigorous.
Engineering development is based on MCOTS or a new start.
Use this reference quantity to support these functions:
Number 9f Units Function Sur_Dorted
0 - Brassboard • Use computer simulation to substi-
ute for soft/hardware testing.
1 - Engineering unit • Design adjustments and test
• System interface compatibilty tests
• Software performance tests
• Testing - through qualification
level
• All changes and fixes
• Mechanical interface tests
• EMI tests
• Human factors integration
• Training (change from plan #1)
1 - Protoflight unit • Qualification tests
*Flight
0 Spare
0 - Training
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Repair and Maintenance Program (Quantity depends upon
whether equipment is built from new-start or is MCOTS)
If MCOTS: Add 2 more units during purchase
for cannibalization and /or for
additional build.
If New S_art: Buy parts for one complete kit plus
buy selected critical parts. (kit is all
the parts, except for chassis,
required to build one unit.)
2.4.4 QUANTITY DRIVERS
A large number of additional factors which influence the quantity of
prototype units have been combined and grouped into the items on
the following list. The reference quantities in each of the two plans
should be adjusted down or up in response to the applicability of
these factors for each design project.
PROTOTYPE QUANTITY DRIVERS
IMPACT OF FAILURE
This factor allows adjustment for extremes of safety, unusually
expensive interfacing apparatus, critical timing of coordinated
events, excessive media coverage, etc.
TECHNOLOGY MATURITY
If, for example, the apparatus has been derived from a high-
quality commercial model which has been in broad use for a number
of years, a brassboard might not be needed and less time might be
spent refining the computer codes. On the other hand, a first-time
application of a state-of-the-art technique will require the full
complement of prototypes.
INTERFACE COMPLEXITY
Additional engineering models might be required for
independent, simultaneous tests for a device with numerous complex
interfaces.
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DEGREEOFPROTOTYPEREUSE
In some cases, it is possible to use prototype hardware for
more than a single purpose. For example, it might be possible to
utilize the engineering model as a training unit for an application
where the program timing, regulations, and simplicity are favorable.
(See Figure 2.4-2)
FLIGHT USE AND DURATION
Requirements for multiple simultaneous uses of a device will
obbiously require more flight articles as will very long-duration
critical applications where sparing is a factor.
APPLICATION LEAD TIME
Additional prototype articles can be required when the
development program is very short. Simultaneous engineering
development of hardware and software, multiple interface tests, and
training at multiple sites can readily increase the prototype and TU
requirements.
2.4.5 QUANTITY SELECTION PROCEDURE
Figure 2.4-1 brings together graphically all of the sub-elements
which have been explained in the previous sections. A hardware
class determination is made from the hardware requirements and
the flow chart is entered from the left. Classes A and B are
implemented by Plan #1 which delineates a set of prototypes to start
with. On the right, the quantity drivers are applied, altering
quantities down or up as described.
In similar manner, classes C and D utilize Plan #2. The drivers are
applied to the plan's standard quantity to derive the numbers to be
built. Since there is only one flight article, it is impossible to reduce
that element further.
2.4.6 PROTOTYPE USAGE MATRIX
Figure 2.4-2 identifies various ways in which multiple use can be
made of prototype hardware. In some cases special permission must
be obtained to use the units as indicated. Special precautions are
needed to safeguard the equipment and to document its various
exposures.
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Figure 2.4-1
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Figure 2.4-2
SUMMARY OF MULTIPLE USAGE OF HARDWARE
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Decisions regarding multiple uses are usually programmatic decisions
which cannot be completely defined by technical factors. The cost
savings in prototype deliverables is obvious if multiple uses can be
made a part of the program plan.
2.5 RELATIVE COSTS
The relative costs (see Figure 2.5-1) of prototyping are dependent
upon numerous and diverse factors. The major ractors impacting the
incremental cost of the hardware development program are
associated with the fidelity of the construction and the requirements
for deliverabililty. The cost is influenced by such subtle factors as the
accounting system used by the subcontractor; i.e., "Is engineering
overhead or manufacturing overhead applied to the construction
effort?" The expense to prepare and deliver prototypes on an
expedited schedule can add to the cost of the program. If the
prototype can be retained at the vendor's plant or if it can be built
and delivered with other hardware, some cost savings can result
from seemingly minor programmatic changes.
2.5.1 AFFECT OF PROTOTYPES ON PROGRAM COSTS
It is clear that each higher level of prototype is usually progressively
more expensive. However, the managers of a number of programs
have discovered (after the fact) that reducing the number of
prototypes in a program does not necessarily reduce the program
cost. In fact, there are numerous instances where the shortage of an
engineering model has significantly increased the cost of R&QA
documentation and manpower. Lost time in the engineering,
environmental testing, and training areas can easily occur when
equipment in not available when needed. A shortage of units for
testing complex interfaces can easily cause testing delays in
concurrent and adjacent projects where interface testing is
scheduled.
The actual cost of all prototype hardware is very low when compared
to the cost of the development program and the flight hardware.
Numerous economies of construction are and can be practiced in the
construction of prototypes, such as the use of commercial grade parts
rather than expensive, high-reliability items. Breadboards and
brassboards are also usually built without special enclosures and
expensive connectors. The increased reliability associated with
design maturity and the efficient utilization of design and test time
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Figure 2.5-1
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made possible through assembly of adequate prototypes represent
value to the program that can far exceed the cost of increased
prototyping activity over the minimal amount required to deliver
hardware.
If the technolog3, is well-defined and a detailed end item
specification can be written, then it is frequently possible to obtain a
firm-fixed-price contract. In such a contract, there is normally no
additional cost for some prototypes (such as breadboards), since
these prototypes are an essential, inherent part of the design and
development process. Thus, the cost of a breadboard does not
necessarily represent and incremental cost to the program. This
should be noted and accommodated by any cost models that use
number of prot6types as an input.
2.5.2 COST OF MCOTS PROGRAM VERSUS NEW DEVELOPMENT
The relative costs of developoing equipment in a well-conducted
MCOTS program may be kept to a total of about 15 to 25 percent of
the cost of a full new development. It is possible that problems
beyond the control of the engineering team will occur at some point
during the program. If the MCOTS program is halted in a timely
manner and a new development is efficiently initiated, the costs can
be kept in the order of 125 percent of what a new development
would have cost in the beginning. On the other hand, costs can ren
several hundred percent of a new development if an MCOTS
development is carried on for a long time beyond the optimum break
point. These realtive costs are shown graphically in Figure 2.5-1.
(Buckley, 1989; Evans, 1989, Land, 1989)
2.6 PARTS CONSIDERATIONS
Various component part problems in the U.S. have a major impact on
the development of a prototyping strategy. They impact commercial,
industrial, military, and NASA activities in many similar ways.
Because of their complexity, the problems will be subdivided into
those affecting high and then moderate reliability applications.
2.6.1 IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEMS
Maximum reliability applications: Criticality 1 and Class A
applications demand that everything possible be done to ensure
reliable operation. When the SBI equipment is deployed in
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conjunction with the Space Station Freedom, the problem is
compounded by the extremely long operational life requirements.
Clearly the best parts obtainable are required for this application.
Three major factors impact the availablilty of the desired parts.
First, the electronic component industry in the United States appears
to be deteriorating-rapidly. Many part manufacturers have ceased
manufacturing operations in the U.S. Others have been sold to foreign
interests and still others have moved off-shore. There exists no U.S.-
made source for many types of parts and for others there is no
second source. Many uncertainties and unacceptable delays reduce
the utility of foreign sources.
Second, the technology associated with many parts, especially
integrated circuits, is changing very rapidly. New, improved
products, are brought on-line continuously at a rapid rate. The older
products are quickly dropped from inventory, as is the support for
obsolete items. Typically, a new computer processor or memory chip
now becomes obsolete in two to three years and support is dropped
in another two. Some parts experts have observed that by the time
an "S" part has been approved for NASA's qualified parts lists it is
perhaps half way to obsolescnece and it will have been superseded
by flight time. Many Shuttle systems contain parts which are
obsolete and totally unavailable. Redesign is usually the only viable
recourse. Electronics for the RMS arm, the main computers, the radar,
and data recorders are but a few systems being redesigned at this
time.
Third, NASA's quantity requirement is generally too small either to
interest manufacturers in extending component availability or to
warrant the expense of dedicated custom fabrication facilities. The
high cost of qualifying a part for "S" rating, for example, tends to
cause manufacturers to stretch availability.
Moderate reliability applications: The problems affecting high-
reliability parts apply equally to moderate-reliability applications as
well. Some consolation in this area can be derived from noting that
the quality of military and commercial microcircuits and certain
other components has increased markedly. The large production
quantities of some of these parts tends to keep them on the market a
little longer. The extremely long operational life required for use on
SSF introduces many problems with availability of repair
components, even for moderate reliability applications.
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2.6.2 CANDIDATE SOLUTIONS
Although there are few good solutions to these problems, several
candidate solutions are listed below:
Maximum i_eliability applications: Many experts consider the
following actions to be appropriate in an effort to achieve maximum
reliability. Some of these are not exactly component solutions but are
strategically associated with the desired objective.
Use components and circuit designs which have a maximum
of maturity or heritage, but which are not approaching end
of useful life
Use the highest grade of parts available (S)
Use highly integrated devices in order to minimize the parts
count and the amount of circuitry outside the device
packages
Configure all custom designed circuitry to facilitate computer
testing
Use extensive assembly and fabrication controls
Refine the design by the proper use of prototypes and design
reviews
Utilize adequate engineering models
Use extreme caution in 100% incoming component test to
avoid subtle damage to components due to static charge,
humidity in temperature cycle, contamination of leads by
chemical contact with skin, etc.
Store spares in an inert environment
Avoid devices which are not hermetically sealed
Consider possible radiation hardening for high density
memories in applications subject to SEU ("single event
upset" associated with high energy particles in space)
Always include a mild random shake test with tests imposed
on 100% of flight articles
Analyze performance signature during test
Stockpile spares
Monitor spares
Consider component DPA (Destructive Physical Analysis -
discussed below) with batch signature
Destructive Physical Analysis is the name given to a process which
provides a complex signature for sectioned samples taken from a
component production line. It detects subtle changes in the product
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generation process before more catastrophic problems develop.
Allied-Signal Aerospace Company is one group who performs this
test in conjunction with the Naval Weapons Support Center, Crane,
Indiana. It is applied to components in various nuclear warheads and
a broad variety of electronic devices and weapon systems.
The process allows detection of any change (induced by
manufacturing variations) which has occurred in a device and which
would cause it to be different in any way from the original
qualification devices. "We have found this expecially useful with
semiconductor products where the generating processes are complex
and interrelated and initial Changes in output performance are not
readily detectable by other means. Once a semiconductor lot is
qualified, destructive physical analysis samples are taken from all
succeeding lots, which not only help detect subtle changes in the
process, but also show lot-to-lot variations which make more visible
the degree of vendor process control." (Wilson, 1989)
It is possible that the use of this or a related process could substitute
for some of the testing and inspection involved in producing "S" level
parts. The outcome might conceivably be equally reliable, but less
expensive components, with much shorter delivery times.
Information on the process is being provided to NASA/JSC and
SR&QA for consideration.
Moderate reliability applications: The major reliability
problems of custom-designed hardware, typical of that used in the
space programs, are workmanship and design imperfections. In
mass-produced products, where these problems have been gradually
refined out, the problem of component part reliability becomes more
obvious. Space hardware never has enough total operating time, with
enough operational feedback, to reach this state. Therefore, while the
reliabililty of components is important, the design and manufacturing
techniques must be given an unusual amount of attention. These
observations make it clear that commercial and military components
are suitable for a great many SSF applications. The items listed below
should receive attention when developing SSF flight hardware of
moderate reliability:
Achieve design maturity through use of proven circuits,
devices, algorithms, and software together with extensive
engineering testing.
Use an adequate number of engineering prototypes
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Use proven fabrication techniques and controls
Use burned and tested Mil-spec. parts
Stockpile kits of components for repairs or additional
builds (store in inert environment)
If item is MC.OTS, stockpile parts and unmodified units
for cannibalization in an inert environment
Provide a liberal quantity of flight spares
Consider a shorter replacement life cycle
In view of the complex part situation, it is anticipated that repair will
become a serious limitation to the long service life of each item. It is
suggested that consideration be given to a shorter replacement life
cycle of perhaps five years or less. Such a period seems more
consistent with the present and expected component obsolescence
cycle time. This possibility should be given much more detailed
study by qualified experts, since its impact on design and parts
selection in prototype and flight hardware is very significant.
(Goeke, Holt, Hymer, Ramsey, Wilson, all 1989)
2.7 PROGRAMMATIC REQUIREMENTS
The Space Station Freedom is a very complicated project and there
must necessarily be a great many rules and regulations which must
be strictly followed. These rules, which are referred to here as
programmatic requirements, are contained in hundreds of documents
containing tens of thousands of pages of details,
The details which apply to the development of prototype and flight
hardware are distributed throughout a large percentage of the
documents. Many of the rules have not been completed and contain
numerous TBDs. It is not yet possible to define absolutely which of
the incomplete rules apply to prototyping. There is no known
document which summarized which requirements the designers of
equipment such as SBI hardware must meet. By comparison, the STS
program has succeeded in compiling such summaries, though the one
applying to DTO/DSO was signed as late as March, 1989.
A major impact on the SBI of not having summary requirements
documents is high cost. Every designer/vendor must adhere strictly
to these requirements. In order to do so, each must possess an
immense set of ever-changing documents and have an operating
understanding of which rules he must follow. At the beginning of a
contract, a binding legal document defines his regulatory obligation.
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This situation is generally like that in any Government contract,
except it is unusually extensive and continually changing. It is
necessary that planners and designers recognize the cost impact of
the technical and legal staff each contractor must access. Completion
of the TBDs and some simplifying and summarizing documentation is
necessary before cost effective SBI prototype development can begin.
The designer's problem can be better appreciated by a review of
Appendix A which is a partial list of applicable documents. Many are
still incomplete and others will be added to the list as they are
defined. A file drawer of these documents as they now exist can be
intimidating to a small vendor of SBI hardware.
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3.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
The following recommendations are based on extensive inputs from
industry and NASA's Life Sciences and Engineering personnel. The
recommendations might be applied essentially to most of the
laboratory equipment which will be flown and operated on the Space
Station Freedom. They apply directly to the SBI equipment and in
particular to the cost-effective use of prototypes in development of
that equipment. Their desired impact is to: 1) keep costs down, 2)
provide the necessary degree of reliability, 3) provide the functional
capability required, and 4) ensure that the vendors are able and
willing to participate in the associated development and production
programs.
1. Use a systems engineering approach to integrate and
coordinage development programs for SBI devices which are
expected to share common hardware element designs. It is essential
that the designs incorporate the common requirements. Further, the
development of common elements must be complete and
qualified/verified prior to imposing their use on other system
designs. Failure of a mandated common element design could cause
failure of other systems in which it was used.
2. Automate functions requiring higher levels of operator
knowledge. Education and skill training can be cost beneficial in
many systems. Incorporation of automation in any SBI hardware
development program may have an impact on prototype quantities
and utilization and should, therefore, be considered in the very
earliest stages of planning and development.
3. Establish shorter use/life expectations for SBI hardware. By
initiating a replacement development program at the four-to-five
year point, costly problems may be avoided. Such problems include
hardware/software obsolescence, loss of developer engineering
support capability, loss of component manufacturing sources,
increased failure rate of hardware approaching the end of its useful
life, and the expense of stocking and tracking critical and obsolete
parts.
4. Stress risk-reduction, not low initial costs alone, in the
development of hardware for long-duration applications on Space
Station Freedom.
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5. Incorporate ways productively to combine science and
engineering personnel in teams for generation of detailed flight
hardware requirements and specifications and for management of
the development programs. These diverse talents, frequently located
in different organizations, must fully cooperate to evolve efficiently
the necessary hardware capability.
6. Re-establish long-term, in-house expertise in flight equipment
engineering, modification, application, and support. It has been
repeatedly shown that strong in-house capability is essential in
obtaining good reliable flight equipment at the lowest possible cost.
7. Generate integrated technical requirements documents.
Although excellent work has been done in the generation of the
technical requirement documents which define SSF hardware
development and its application, there are many TBDs remaining
which must be clarified before SBI flight hardware contractors can
begin their work. Serious consideration needs to be given to methods
of simplifying the designers' task of properly applying these
directives. Most manufacturers would be forced to incorporate a
large staff, over a considerable period of time, to insure adherence to
the thousands of applicable details. The cost for such a staff, (which
must be added onto the actual hardware expense) would be
significant. Small manufacturers, who comprehend the magnitude
and seriousness of the problem, simply might not be able to bid on
SBI development work for lack of staff experienced in reading and
interpreting large stacks of specifications.
8. Examine the actual long-term reliability improvement due to
the use of "S" level parts. Many factors in the U.S. component
manufacturing industry have changed. Today's very rapid rate of
electronic component obsolescence and the short period of
availability (with technical support) demand careful attention to the
effects on hardware development cycles, repair/maintenance, and
logistics. Use of other MIL-specification levels, batch sample
signature techniques, and more frequent redesign cycles are some
factors which should be examined for potential solutions to long
component procurement lead times and high program-life costs.
9. Develop mechanisms for indemnifying hardware and software
development contractors. Rapid changes in U.S. litigation practices
have made it almost impossible for small-to-medium-sized
manufacturers of medical equipment to obtain reasonably priced
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product liability insurance. Quoted insurance premiums may run
several orders of magnitude more than the hardware costs. Large
companies with an existing insurance "umbrella," covering many
product lines, are able to obtain coverage at high, but manageable,
costs. However, in many instances small specialized manufacturers
are needed for Itheir level of expertise, experience with development
hardware, and their more acute interest in production of small
quantities of customized prototype and flight hardware.
I0. Standardize batteries and chargers. A recurring problem,
obvious from a review of the SBI hardware list and common to
adaptation of off-the-shelf hardware, is associated with the power
source. Modem electronic hardware is frequently designed to utilize
rechargeable batteries. More convenient and cost-effective use can
be made of commercial off-the-shelf hardware if NASA can
determine safe and acceptable methods which allow less restrictive
use of rechargeable batteries. Utilizing conventional power sources
can reduce the tests required in order to prove the performance of
the power supply interfaces.
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4.0 CONCLUSIONS
Prototype hardware development programs conducted by NASA and
within various industries offer an experience knowledge-base which
is very useful in establishing guidelines and procedures to be used
by planners and developers providing future space biology research
hardware. This study has been able to combine such knowledge with
contemporary facts related to SSF regulations and component
limitations to evolve information which should contribute to the
success and cost efficiency of SBI hardware development. The
following items summarize the major findings of this study for ease
of application:
1. Prototype development programs may be subdivided according
to: 1) type of application, 2) degree of reliability required (class), 3)
availability of usable devices in the commercial market, and 4) the
required useful life expectancy.
2. The numbers of required units and the development
implementation methods may be determined using an algorithm
described in Figure 2.4-1 and the associated text (Section 2.4)
together with consideration of sets of "drivers."
3. There are two principal approaches to SBI hardware
development that drive prototype development programs: 1)
modification of commercial off-the-shelf equipment and 2) new
development.
4. Each approach can be generalized with essential steps and
hazards as identified in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
5. Prototypes are needed to varying degrees in hardware and
software development programs of every type.
6. Computer simulation can substitute, in some cases, for
breadboard and brassboard prototypes.
7. Nothing can efficiently substitute for the design verification
test unit (DVTU) or engineering model (EM) prototype.
8. The operational experience base of an MCOTS prototype
program can enhance reliability due to product maturity and
evolution from extensive user feedback.
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9. Significant engineering design efforts and extensive prototype
testing must be accomplished in a new-build development program
in order to approach the maturity of an MCOTS development.
10. A MCOTS prototype development program can potentially
provide a go0d flight article for a cost of 15 to 25% of a full new
development program. If done poorly it can cost many times as much
as a new development.
11. It is necessary to build a mechanism into an MCOTS program
which will terminate the program and activiate a new build from
"scratch" if problems exceed Certain limits.
12. The actual cost of a full complement of prototype development
hardware is very small compared to the development itself and the
associated flight hardware. It is small also when compared to the
impacts which can occur due to a shortage of prototype hardware.
13. For contracted development programs, some non-deliverable
prototypes, such as breadboards, do not add cost directly to the
program. However, additional deliverable units obviously add
moderate cost the the program.
14. Currently, prototype development programs are impacted by
the reduced availability of U.S. component manufacturers as well as
the scarcity of potential subcontractorts experienced with both
medical and space hardware.
15. Maintenance and repair of equipment in long-duration
applications is severely impacted by the current high rate of
component obsolescence, early elimination of inventory and
termination of factory support. Thus, an abundance of component
parts, spares, and prototypes should be purchased with the initial
contract.
16. Because of the impact of parts obsolescence problems on SSF
equipment, consideration should be given to a shorter planned useful
life cycle of perhaps 5 years.
17. The major limitation to reliability in high-quality, mass-
produced equipment is component quality and the stochastic
features of component tolerances.
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v18. The major limitations to reliability in high-quality equipment,
produced in small quantities, are design imperfections and
assembly/workmanship problems.
19. Since space flight hardware quantities are always small, major
attention must be paid primarily to design and workmanship
imperfections and secondarily to parts problems.
20. Class A equipment requires the highest reliability attainable.
Therefore, maximum care must be applied to design refinement,
workmanship, and component quality. In this case, Destructive
Physical Analysis techniques being pioneered by DOD and DOE offer a
potential for ensuring greater component consistency during
component production runs continuing over long periods of time.
21. Prototype hardware development programs beginning from a
new start can potentially make excellent use of modularization and
commonality techniques. Special safeguards must be observed to
prevent propagation of technical, schedule, and lifetime availability
problems of the mandated module into each development program.
22. Prototype hardware development programs beginning from a
new start are better suited than MCOTS programs for incorporation
of automation techniques.
23. Exceptional NASA in-house technical knowledge and hands-on
experience will facilitate increasing success in flight prototype
hardware development and evaluation while providing conditions
which yield developments at the lowest cost.
24. The interrelationships between the quantity drivers and other
factors that should be used for the determination of the ideal
quantities and types of prototypes that should be required of SBI
hardware are too complex to model in a meaningful, yet simplistic,
algorithm.
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APPENDIX A
A PARTIAL LIST OF DOCUMENTS APPLICABLE TO
SSF HARDWARE PROTOTYPING
ANS I/MIL-STD: 18 i 5A Ada Language Reference Manual
22 Jan, 1983
ISO 7498/4 International Standardization Org.
JPL 86-14 The NASA Aerospace Battery
Safety Handbook, 15 July, '86
JSC 31000 Product Assurance Requirements
Volume 4
JSC SPEC M1 Specification Marking and
Requirements Volume 4 4.9.1.1
JSC TBD Space Station/NSTS Safety
Identification, Vol. 4 2.1.4.1,2
JSCM 1700D JSC Safety Manual, Vol. 4, 2.3
JSC 20527 Space Station EVA User Interfaces
Design Guidelines Documentor
19 Nov. '86
JSC 20793 Manned Space Vehicle Battery
Safety Handbook, Sept '85
JSC 21053 Space Station Program Payload
Integration Plan
JSC 30213 Space Station Program Design
Criteria and Practices. 15 Apr. '86
JSC 30233 Space Station Requirements for
Materials and Processes
26 Nov. '86
A-1
JSC 30237
JSC 30238
JSC 30240
JSC 30242
JSC 30243
JSC 30244
JSC 30245
JSC 30425
JSC 31000
JSC 31011
JSC 31013
JSC 31016
Space Station Electromagnetic
Emission and Susceptibility Re-
quirements for Electromagnetic
Compatibility, 1 Dec '86
Space Station Electromagnetic
Techniques (MIL-STD-462
amended)
Space Station Grounding Standard
Space Station Cable/Wire Design
and Control Standard
Space Station Specification, System
Electromagnetic Compatibility
Requirements (MIL-E-6051D
amended)
Space Station Software Standards
Document
Space Station Electrical and
Electronic Material and Process
Standard
Space Station Systems Require-
ment, Natural Environment
Definition for Design, 15 Jan '87
Product Assurance Requirements
Volume 4
WP-2 Master Verification Plan
November '86
Medical Requirements of an
Inflight Medical System for
Space Station, Revision A
30 Nov. '87
FSE/OSE General Design
Requirements, Nov. '86
A-2
JSC 31019
JSC 31025
JSC 32015
NSTS 07700
KMI 1710.1
MIL-HDBK-217
MIL-STD-105D
MIL-STD-414
MIL-STD-756
MIL-STD-970
MIL-STD-975
NASA RP 1024
NASA STD 3000
JSC Software Management Plan
Acquisition Logistics Support
Requirements
Microbial Contamination
Space Shuttle Systems Payload
Accommodations, Vol. 14, Revision
J, 21 Oct. '86
Safety, Reliability and Quality
Assurance Program, Vol. 4, 2.1.6
and 4.1.3
Reliability Prediction of Electronic
Equipment, Vol. 4, 3.2.5.2
Sampling Procedures and Tables
for Inspection by Attributes,
Vol. 4, 4.11.1
Sampling Procedures by Variables
for Percent Defect, Vol 4, 4.11.1
Reliability Modeling and Predic-
tion, Vol. 4, 3.2.5.3
Order of Precedence for the
Selection of Standards and
Specifications, Vol. 4, 3.3.2
NASA Standard Electrical,
Electronic and Electro-mechanical
Parts List, Vol. 4, 3.3.1.2 and
3.3.1.4 and 3.3.1.6
Anthropometric Source Book,
Vol. 1 11 Nov., '86
Man Systems Integration Standard
Vol. 4, 21 Nov. '86
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VNHB 1700.i
NHB 1700.1
NSTS 07700
SSP 30240
SSP 30257
NHB 1700.7A
SSP 30000
SSP 30309
SSP 30312
SSP 30233
SSP 30234
SSP 30309
Basic Safety Manual, Vol. 1A,
2.1.5 and 2.3 and 4.2.3
System Safety, Vol. 3, 2.2.1
Space Shuttle Systems Payload
Accommodations, Vol. 14, Revision
J, 21 Oct. '86
Space Station Grounding Standard
Vol. 3
Architectural Control Document
Man-Systems: Revision B
15 June '88
Safety Policy and Requirements
for Payloads Using the STS
Vol. 4 2.2.2
Product Assurance Requirements
Section 9, Revision A 18 Mar '88
Instructions for the Preparation of
Hazard Analysis for the SSP
Revision A, 15 Aug '88
Electrical, Electronic and Electro-
mechanical Parts Management and
Implementation Plan for Space
Station Jan '87
Space Station Requirements for
Materials Processing Vol. 4, 3.2.11
Instructions for Preparation of
FMEA/CIL For Space Station
Vol. 4, 3.2.3
Instructions for the Preparation of
Hazard Analysis, Vol. 4, 2.2.3
A-4
SSP 30312
SSP 30313
SSP 30423
SSP 30260
SSP 30261
SSP 30262
SSP 30263
SSP 30264
SSP 30420
SSP 30482
A-5
EEE Parts Management for Imple-
mentation Plan Vol. 4, 3.3.1.1
and 3.3.1.7 and 3.3.1.8
Space Station Reliability/Main-
tainability Analysis, Vol. 4, 3.2.5
Space Station Approved EEE Parts
List (SSAEPL) Vol. 4, 3.3.1.2
Architectural Control Document
Communications and Tracking
System Revision A,. Change 1,
5 Feb '88
Architectural Control Document
Data Management System,
Revision B, Change 1,
19 Feb '88
Architectural Control Document
Environmental Control Life
Support System, Revision B,
30 July '88
Architectural Control Document
Electrical Power System
Revision B, Change 1, 19 Feb '88
Architectural Control Document
Fluid Management Systems
Revision B, 15 /an '87
Space Station Electromagnetic,
Ionizing Radiation and Plasma
Environment Definition and
Design Requirements, 15 Ian '87
Space Station Electrical Power
Characteristics, 5 May '87
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APPENDIX B
PERSONAL INTERVIEWS AND OPINIONS
Aeivoli, Demonic; Program Manager for Commonality; General
Electric Co., Philadelphia, PA. Telephone conversation covered
wide range of flight hardware related subjects including:
commercial communication satellites, earth resources (Landsat),
and military satellites. Discussion included Protoflight type
articles. He stressed that under all circumstances use of an
engineering model prototype is essential.
Barnes, William J.; Design Engineering Manger, AT&T Technolo-
gies Systems: Burlington, NC. Mr. Barnes discussed use of proto-
types in AT&T laboratory (was Bell Telephone Laboratory)
development of guided missiles and commercial telephone
equipment. He was unable to discuss exact details of under sea
telephone signal repeater amplifiers for proprietary reasons.
The laboratories utilize a large number of prototypes and
extensive testing before building flight or commercial opera-
tional equipment.
Buckley, J.; Program General Manager, Science and Applications
Programs, General Electric, Cherry Hills, NJ. Mr. Buckley
discussed electronic parts problems and protoflight hardware
programs. He described how program costs and schedules had
been unfavorably impacted by lack of an engineering protoytpe
model. His experience strongly demonstrates that it is essential
to perform engineering development and thorough testing on
prototype equipment prior to application of full R&QA formal
documentation.
Burns, Frederick T., Jr.; Assistant Manager, Flight Support
Equipment Office; Orbiter and GFE Projects Office Johnson Space
Center. Mr. Burns provided extensive information on the rules,
regulations, and procedures which must be complied with in
order to fly equipment on the STS. He identified documents
which greatly simplify and facilitate the process for hardware
of certain types such as DTO and DSO programs.
Cubley, Dean, Ph.D.; Director of Engineering, Communications
and Data Systems Associates, Webster, Texas. Dr. Cubley
described how their company has been able to use computer
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simulation in place of breadboard and brassboard prototypes
in a protoflight development program. The single flight article
will be used to conduct superconductivity experiments in space.
Evans, James S.; Technical Assistant, Life Sciences Project
Division, Space and Life Sciences Office, Johnson Space Center.
In two long and wide ranging meetings, Mr. Evans discussed
many aspects of development programs for science and medical
prototype equipment. He discussed both the good and bad
experiences using the various techniques described in this study.
He shared findings of a number of investigations he has
conducted involving mediCal and science hardware used
throughout all of NASA's manned space flight programs.
Fielder, George H.; Manager for Orbiter and GFE Projects; Safety,
Reliability and Quality Assurance Office, Johnson Space Center.
Mr. Fielder provided information related to the programmatic
requirements imposed on flight hardware to be used on the
Shuttle spacecraft. He also suggested individual persons to be
contacted for specialized details and experiences.
Frey, Michael; Director, Mechanical Engineering; Intermedics
Inc., Freeport, Tx. Mr. Frey's company is a world leader in the
design and manufacture of implantable medical devices such as
pacemakers and drug dispensers. Their products require the
highest reliability attainable. He described their extensive and
essential use of prototype development and test hardware. He
described the effect of the parts availablilty problems on their
company. It is now necessary for them to manufacture most of
their components. With the exception of a few items such as
batteries, they build all of their components including custom
microcircuits and semiconductors.
Glanville, Roy W.; SSF Regulation Specialist; Reliability and
Maintainability Division; Safety, Reliabililty and Quality Assur-
ance Office, Johnson Space Center. Mr. Glanville provided an
excellent insight into the documentation which will control
every aspect of the design and application of flight hardware
for the Space Station Freedom. He provided an understanding
which allowed this study to identify the magnitude and com-
plexity of the regulatory problem confronting any manufacturer
wishing to design and build prototype and flight hardware for
the SSF.
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10. Goeke, Robert, Ph.D.; Center for Space Research, MIT, Cambridge
MA. Dr. Geoke has had extensive experience in the design and
fabrication of flight hardware for scientific investigations in
space. Included are several pieces of LSLE equipment and astro
physics payloads. He provided this study with much additional
insight into the parts problems, the essential need for in-house
design and hands-on hardware expertise, cost effective use of
FMEAs, and many details which can boost reliability and flight
article quantifies while keeping costs at a minimum.
11. Graham, Olin L.; Section Head, Television Systems Section, Track-
ing and Communications Division, Engineering Directorate,
Johnson Space Center. Mr. Graham provided details on prototype
development programs, part problems, requirement documen-
tation, and adaptation of commercial off-the-shelf hardware.
Based on his extensive experience with flight hardware, he
strongly recommended incorporation of numerous prototypes to
achieve the greatest technical maturity possible.
12. Harlan, Charles S.; Director, Safety, Reliability & Quality Assur-
ance Directorate, Johnson Space Center. The meeting with Mr.
Harlan assisted in determining good contacts from which to
obtain historical information. Part problems were discussed and
he and his staff are interested in examining the potential
benefits of Destructive Physical Analysis of semiconductor
products.
13. Harris, Jackson D.; Technical Manager, Man-Systems Support,
Lockheed Engineering. Mr. Harris assisted in understanding
details of the Space Station Freedom programmatic technical
requirements. Various subjects were discussed including which
organizations and individuals could provide needed information
on scientific instruments and their integration into SSF.
14. Holt, Aubry; Manager, Oil Equipment Systems Design; Smith
International, Houston, Tx. Mr. Holt's company specializes in
development and use of oil field instruments which operate
under extremely adverse conditions of temperature, vibration,
and pressure at the bottom of an oil well hole. Reliability
is essential in their hardware. His insight into the parts problem,
the use of development prototypes, and quality control testing
contributed much pertinent new information.
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15. Hymer, Robert L.; Manager, Nuclear Weapons Manufacturing
Office, US Department of Energy, Albuquerque Operations
Office, Albuquerque, NM. Mr. Hymer is responsible for nuclear
weapons manufacturing in the United States and has an extreme
interest in and understanding of reliable hardware development."
He is an advocate of the use of numerous prototypes to develop
device maturity before production. His insight into the parts
problem led this study to the technique of Destructive Physical
Analysis and the experts at Allied and Crane who perform it.
16. Kujawski, Peter; Chief, Re-Entry Systems, General Electric
Company, Philadelphia, PA. Mr. Kujawski, who previously
headed the GE Science and Applications Programs, is highly
experienced in the development of reliable space flight hard-
ware. He managed a massive protoflight program which
produced the UARS (Upper Atmospher Research Satellite). His
experience proves that it is extremely false economy to use
too few prototype articles in a development program. He
provided insight into the techniques of protoflight development.
17. Land, D. Kenneth; Chief, Tracking and Techniques Branch, Track-
ing and Communications Division, Engineering Directorate,
Johnson Space Center, Houston, Tx. Mr. Land has extensive
experience in all aspects of design and development of flight
hardware. He has had notable success with modification of off-
the
shelf hardware. His identification of important details has
contributed to the study.
18. Ramsey, Jim; Manager, Physical Analysis Laboratories, Naval
Weapons Support Center, Crane, Indiana. Mr. Ramsey has a
very great insight into all aspects of flight hardware reliability
and production control. He contributed many details to this
study. He and his personnel perform the Destructive Physical
Analysis for DOD, DOE, and numerous private companies. They
provided an understanding of the process and ways in which it
may contribute to the SBI program.
19. Richards, Randall W.; Section Head, Command and Modulation
Section, Tracking and Communications Division, Engineering
Directorate, JSC. Mr. Richards has extensive experience in the
development of GFE flight hardware. He is a strong advocate of
ample prototype hardware. He assisted in understanding the
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requirements placed on GFE flight hardware by the Shuttle
program and clarified many points about the STS documenta-
tion tree. He provided very useful history of prototype develop-
ment programs of all types.
20. Schulze, Arthur E.; Director, Biomedical Technologies Division;
Lovclace Scientific Resources. Mr. Schulze provided some
opinions on various aspects of designing and manufacturing
medical and scientific equipment. During his career in the
biomedical device industry, he has had the opportunity
to optimize techniques for providing mature, reliable, hospital
and space flight hardware. He has provided an historical
perspective from the vendor's side of NASA's hardware
programs which date back to the Skylab era.
21. Sinderson, Richard, Jr.; Section Head, Telemetry and Audio
Section, Tracking and Communications Division Engineering
Directorate, Johnson Space Center. Mr. Sinderson provided a
myriad of facts describing the various methods by which NASA,
JSC, has obtained much of its manned flight hardware from the
time of Apollo on. His detailed procedures preserve much of the
development technique for future developers to adapt for their
needs.
22. Wilson, Burris G.; Engineering Manager, Kansas City Division
Allied Signal Aerospace Company, Kansas City, Kansas.
Mr. Wilson's organization performs many of the hardware
development and manufacturing activities involved in equipping
the nations weapons arsenals. He has provided information and
contacts which have assisted this study in scoping the parts
reliability problems. The Destructive Physical Analysis technique
which he described is of interest to NASA's SR&QA personnel
and will be explored by them for possible use by JSC.
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APPENDIX D
LIFE SCIENCES HARDWARE LIST
FOR THE
SPACE STATION FREEDOM ERA
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